is achievable irrespective of the number of antennas the eavesdropper may have as long as the cooperative jammer has the same number of antennas as the eavesdropper. The design insight revealed is that the price to pay for the increase in the number of antennas at the eavesdropper is an equivalent increase in the number of antennas at the cooperative jammer in order to maintain the same s.d.o.f.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel model in [1] provides the foundation for exploiting noisy communication channels to secure information at the physical layer. Specifically, Wyner in [1] has established the secrecy capacity for a channel with one sender, one receiver, and one eavesdropper assuming that the received signal at the eavesdropper is a degraded version of what is received by the legitimate receiver. This result has been extended to more general discrete memoryless channels in [2] . Secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel has been found in [3] . The wiretap channel model has since been extended to an abundance of multi-terminal models, see for example [4] - [11] .
In reference [8] , cooperative jamming is proposed in the multiple access wiretap channel. A transmitter that is not capable of achieving positive secrecy rate for its own, rather than staying silent, can transmit a jamming signal that hurts the eavesdropper more than the legitimate receiver. Equivalently, in a single user wiretap scenario, an external cooperative jammer may be incorporated to improve the achievable secrecy rate of the system [12] . While cooperative jamming is useful in improving the secrecy rate for finite signal to noise ratio (SNR) values in these models, it is known that using Gaussian signaling and jamming achieves zero secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) [13] . Recently, it has been shown that using structured signaling both for transmission and for cooperative jamming can remedy this shortcoming and achieve positive s.d.o.f. [12] .
More recently, an upper bound of 1 2 on the s.d.o.f. of Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer with one antenna at each node has been derived in [14] , tightening the earlier bound of 2 3 [15] . One justification of the tight upper bound in [14] is that the optimal jamming signal that completely covers the received information signal at the eavesdropper, can never occupy less than half of received dimensions at the legitimate receiver. Building on this intuition, in this paper, we answer the question whether it is possible to find jamming signals that completely cover the information signal at an eavesdropper with multiple antennas, while occupying only half of received dimensions at the legitimate receiver. In other words, whether the s.d.o.f. of 1 2 is achievable even if the eavesdropper has multiple antennas. The answer turns out to be affirmative as long as the cooperative jammer has the same number of antennas as the eavesdropper as shown in this paper.
The key for the achievability lies in the fact that a cooperative jammer with the same number of antennas as the eavesdropper can transmit a scaled copy of the same jamming signal from each antenna so that the received copies of this jamming signal at each antenna of the eavesdropper completely cover the received information signal at this antenna. On the other hand, the legitimate receiver receives the information signal and multiple copies of the same jamming signal which enables achieving s.d.o.f. of The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we introduce the channel model. Section III describes the achievable scheme. We conclude the paper in section IV. Notation: The set of integers {−Q, −Q + 1, · · · , Q − 1, Q}, where Q is an integer, is denoted by C(Q). The set {αA} is the set of all elements that belong to the set A each is scaled by the factor α. We denote the random variables with upper case letters and the random vectors with bold upper case letters. Matrices are also denoted by bold upper case letters. The distinction between random vectors and matrices is clear from the context. 
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider a Gaussian wiretap channel composed of a legitimate transmitter-receiver pair, an external eavesdropper, and an external cooperative jammer as depicted in Fig. 1 . The transmitter and receiver are equipped with one antenna each. The eavesdropper and the cooperative jammer, on the other hand, have M ≥ 2 antennas each.
The received signals at the receiver and the eavesdropper can be expressed as
(1)
T are the transmitted signals from the transmitter and the cooperative jammer, respectively, where X 2i is the transmitted signal from the ith antenna of the cooperative jammer, i = 1, 2, · · · , M . Y 1 ∈ R is the received signal at the legitimate receiver. The received signal vector at the eavesdropper is
T , where Y 2i is the received signal at ith antenna of the eavesdropper. h 1 ∈ R and h 2 ∈ R M are the channel gains from the transmitter and the cooperative jammer, respectively, to the legitimate receiver. The channel gains from the transmitter and the cooperative jammer to the eavesdropper are, respectively,
We assume that all channel gains are constant, real valued, and known at all terminals. It is also assumed that all channel gains are drawn from a continuous distribution.
are additive Gaussian noises at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, where Z 1 , Z 21 , · · · , and Z 2M are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. The power constraints on the transmitted signals are E X 2 1 ≤ P and E X Secrecy rate R s is said to be achievable if, for any σ > 0, there exists a length-n channel code (2 nRs , n) such that the probability of decoding error P e = Pr{Ŵ = W} ≤ σ, and that the uncertainty of the transmitted message W at the eavesdropper given its observation, Y n 2 , is almost equal to the uncertainty of the message W without this observation 1 , i.e.,
The secrecy capacity of a channel, C s , is defined as the closure (supremum) of all achievable secrecy rates for this channel. For a channel with real valued coefficients, the achievable secure degrees of
, in order to jam the eavesdropper and put it at a disadvantage with respect to the legitimate receiver. However, this friendly interference from the cooperative jammer affects the legitimate receiver as well. Thus, we need to design information and jamming signals such that the jamming signals cause the most harm to the reception capability of the eavesdropper, while causing the least possible harm at the legitimate receiver. Coordinated jamming signals at the M antennas of the cooperative jammer accomplish the task of completely confusing the eavesdropper with M antennas about the information message, while at the same time occupying half of received dimensions at the legitimate receiver at the high SNR regime, as shown next.
III. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
In this section, we show that we can achieve s.d.o.f. of 1 2 for the channel in (1) irrespective of the number of antennas at the eavesdropper as long as the cooperative jammer has the same number of antennas as the eavesdropper.
A. Encoding Scheme
Following the real interference alignment technique in [14] , [16] , we express the transmitted signals from the transmitter and the cooperative jammer as
where U and V are i.i.d. uniform over the set C(Q), where Q is an integer which will be chosen in Section III-B. The lengthn sequence of i.i.d. U 's carries the message W . On the other hand, V is the jamming signal transmitted from the cooperative jammer. The jamming precoder c = [c 1 c 2 · · · c M ] T , where c i is a scaling for the jamming signal V at the ith antenna of the cooperative jammer, for i = 1, 2, · · · , M . Specifically, the jamming precoder c is chosen to align the jamming signal V over the information signal U at each antenna of the eavesdropper. The constant α simply normalizes the transmission power to satisfy the power constraints at the transmitter and the M antennas of the cooperative jammer.
By encoding the transmitted signals from the transmitter and the cooperative jammer as in (2) and (3), respectively, the received signals at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are given by
In order to perfectly align the jamming signal V over the information U at each antenna of the eavesdropper, the jamming precoder c has to satisfy the condition
where the (M × M ) matrix G 2 is almost surely full rank since the channel gains are all assumed to be drawn from a continuous distribution. When the cooperative jammer has the same number of antennas as the eavesdropper, the jamming precoder c is given by
Therefore, the received signals at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can be rewritten as
Note that the number of antennas at the cooperative jammer has to be greater than or equal to the number of antennas at the eavesdropper so that (6) has a solution for c.
Since X 1 and X 2 are independent and the channel is memoryless, the secrecy rate
is achievable [2] . Computing the exact value of this expression is challenging. In Section III-C, we will instead compute a lower bound for this achievable rate which will be sufficient to show our main result.
B. Decoding Scheme
The legitimate receiver employs a hard decision decoder which maps the received signal to the nearest point in the received constellation. From (8) , it is easy to see that the received constellation points at the legitimate receiver belong to the set
where U and V are the transmit constellations at the transmitter and the cooperative jammer, respectively. Since h 1 and h
2 g 1 are almost surely rationally independent, there exists a many to one mapping from the received constellation Y 1 to the transmit constellation U [16] . Therefore, the legitimate receiver passes the output of the hard decoder through this many to one mapping from Y 1 to U in order to decode the signal U . Then, after n channel uses, the legitimate receiver can use a typical set decoder to decode the message W from the decoded length-n sequence of U 's.
Notice that the only source of error in decoding the signal U from the received signal Y 1 is the additive Gaussian noise. Therefore, if the estimated signal at the legitimate receiver isÛ , the probability of decoding error at the legitimate receiver P e = Pr Û = U can be bounded as
where d min is the minimum distance between received constellation points at the legitimate receiver. Bounding the performance of the decoder, i.e., the probability of decoding error P e , is used to bound the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme.
From (11) , in order to bound P e , we need to calculate d min first. The distances between the points in the received constellation are irregular and calculating the exact minimum distance is difficult. However, we can use the KhintchineGroshev Theorem in number theory to lower bound d min . The distance d between any two points Y 1 and Y 1 in the received constellation Y 1 can be expressed as
Applying Khintchine-Groshev theorem, we have
where for each > 0, there exists a constant k such that the above equation holds for almost all channel gains. Thus, we have the probability of error P e is bounded by
We choose α = . Choose Q such that
where η and ς are constants that do not depend on the power P . The constant ς is used to set Q to an integer. Thus, we have
where µ is a constant which does not depend on power. As a result, we have that the probability of error P e → 0 as P → ∞.
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Recall that R s = I(X 1 ; Y 1 ) − I(X 1 ; Y 2 ) is achievable. We will compute a lower bound for the right hand side, and thus also an achievable secrecy rate, as follows. First, the mutual information between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is bounded as
where (17) follows from the Markov chain (U → X 1 → Y 1 → U ), (19) follows from Fano's inequality, and (20) follows from the uniformity assumption of U over U = C(Q), where |C(Q)| = 2Q + 1.
Using the bound on the probability of decoding error, P e , in (16), we have that
Next, we find an upper bound for I(X 1 ; Y 2 ) as follows:
where (23) follows since X 1 and Z 2 are independent. Using (9) and (25), we have
= log 4Q + 1 2Q + 1 (28)
where the inequality in (27) follows since the entropy of the uniform random variable over the set {−2Q, −2Q + 1, · · · , 2Q−1, 2Q} is an upper bound to the entropy of U +V . Using the lower bound in (21) and the upper bound in (29), we have the following achievable secrecy rate
(31)
D. Achievable Secure Degrees of Freedom
Using (31), we can compute the achievable s.d.o.f. as follows.
where (34) follows from substituting (15) 
